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Abstract: This paper discusses a dominant group in local 
politics of Sumenep that is based on a pesantren network 
that is usually referred to as the Bani Syarqawi. The author 
argues that the superiority of religious clerics (kyai) over the 
mass in Sumenep has been mainly based on their 
adaptability to the transformational change of their role 
from traditional-charismatic to rational-authoritative by 
means of educational excellence and genealogical network 
that is both powerful and full of conflict. The social 
significance of the superiority found its way through a 
social change that enabled the religious elite to be the 
dominant elite group in Sumenep when the power of their 
royal counterpart declined rapidly. Equipped with 
Weberian model of authority, the author argues that the 
formalistic tendency of elite theory can be balanced with a 
perspective that elite can develop and exercise power over 
the mass even they are outside the formal structure of 
politics.  
Keywords: Religious elites, political recruitment, the Bani 
Syarqawi, kyai, pesantren. 
Introduction 
The existing polities may have various styles of power relation 
(such as ‘democratic’, ‘authoritarian’, ‘semi-authoritarian’, ‘quasi-demo-
cracy’, and many others). However, all of them have one thing in 
common: the existence of larger number of mass on the one hand, and 
the smaller number of ruling persons on the other hand. The notions 
of elite with significant role in their communities have always been the 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank to an anonymous reader for constructive comments on the earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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central theme in political science. Studies of democracy, authorita-
rianism, bureaucracy, social institutions, elections, and so forth, are 
actually looking at the dynamics of elite in the societies from various 
approaches, theoretical backgrounds, and methodological standings. 
People witness some paradigmatic switch in political science,2 such as 
from individual perspective to institutional determination, but the 
discipline has always had central passion of elite issues. Politics, 
nonetheless, is all about power: how people gain and use power and 
how they keep it on their hands. Or, how people become and remain 
the elite of their societies. 
This notion is also true in the case of transition from authoritarian 
regime, with the result varying from the sunrise of democratic polity to 
simply circulation of people in power. Studying the transition process 
would to a very large extent mean looking at how elite-mass relations 
changes take shape. Indonesia, a country with an ongoing political 
transition since the demise of President Soeharto and his military 
backed regime in 1998,3 has never been any exception to this. The 
analysis of Indonesian political change would also require, among 
other aspects, a great deal of understanding of the elite circulations 
both nationally and locally. While Indonesian elite at national level 
have received sufficient attention from observers,4 the local elite have 
never enjoyed that kind of luxury. This paper is intended to fill in the 
gap, by looking at ruling elite at local level. It takes a case study of 
                                                 
2  See for instance Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002). 
3 Indonesian politics since 1998 has been discussed by so many academics. See for 
examples, Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman (eds), Indonesia: The Uncertain 
Transition (Adelaide: Crawford Publishing, 2001); Mikaela Nyman, Democratising 
Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of Reformasi (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2006); 
Olle Törnquist, “Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation,” Third World Quarterly, 21, 
No. 3 (2000); idem., “What’s Wrong with Indonesia’s Democratization?,” Asian Journal 
of Social Science, 30, No. 3 (2002). 
4  For the latest accounts, see for instance Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto; 
Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2005); Rodd McGibbon, “Indonesian Politics in 2006: Stability, Compromise 
and Shifting Contests over Ideology,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 42, No. 3 
(2006); Dirk Tomsa, “The Defeat of Centralized Paternalism: Factionalism, Assertive 
Regional Cadres, and the Long Fall of Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung,” Indonesia, 
81 (2006). The most outstanding, pioneer studies of Indonesian elite can be found in 
Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia’s Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1976). 
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pesantren-based5 ruling elite in an Indonesian coastal town of Sumenep 
known as the Bani Syarqawi, and shows that religious elite is a ruling 
class who uses its power with impressive flexibility.6 
Ruling Elite: Theoretical Assumptions 
Elite theory is one of the core theoretical pillars in social and 
political sciences. This theory sees society as divided into two groups, 
i.e. the ruling minority (elite) and the majority who are ruled by the 
minority. There are two main characteristics of elite theory. First, elite 
theory pays greater attention to national elite,7 and second, elite theory 
refers to elite as the small number of people who hold formally 
institutionalised power within their community.8 
The classical elite theory is attributed to (among others) Pareto, 
Mosca, and Michels. 9  They shared a common view that egalitarian 
ideas such as democracy was not realistic, because political power 
would always be exercised by small number of people with great 
privileges. For Mosca, resources of power are never distributed equally, 
and thus a cohesive minority will always be able to control the 
incoherent majority. The reason of inequality of power distribution is, 
according to Pareto, to be found in the unequal physical, intellectual, 
and moral quality of people. Those with the higher quality would 
become the elite with power to manipulate the mass. With a slightly 
different line of argument, Michels maintained that within all 
organisations, power would be centralised in the hands of small 
dominant groups that were able to control the larger part of 
organisation. Michels called this the iron law of oligarchy. 
In the more recent era, Mills and Dye are amongst the widely 
respectable elite theorists. They built their theoretical elaboration based 
                                                 
5 Pesantren is traditional Islamic boarding school, the student of which is called santri. 
6 Bani literally means the ‘descendant of’; and the Bani Syarqawi would literally means 
the descendants of Syarqawi. This term sometimes also refers to the extended network 
of the santri of Syarqawi’s pesantren. 
7  Eva Etzioni-Halevy, “Network Governance as a Challange to Democratic Elite 
Theory,” (Paper presented at the Conference on Democratic Network Governance, 
Copenhagen, May 22-23, 2003), p. 4; H. T. Reynolds, “The Power Elite,” 
(http://www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_Power_Elite.htm, created 1996). 
8 D. Ali Arslan, “Elite Theory Applied to Contemporary Turkish Society,” International 
Journal of Human Science, 2, No. 2 (2005), p. 3. 
9 Andrew Heywood, Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
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on America’s national elite, and both argue that America is controlled 
by small number of people.10 Dye maintain that people occupying the 
upper echelons of the country leadership control the vast majority of 
economic resources, industrial assets, academic institutions, private 
foundations, and so forth. Earlier than Dye, Mills has argued that three 
groups of people dominated the governing elite of America. These 
groups are the highest political leaders including the president and a 
handful of key cabinet members and close advisers, major corporate 
owners and directors, and high-ranking military officers. Known as 
power elite theory, Mills’ and Dye’s perspective depicts the elite as a 
coherent entity. 
The national and formal tendencies in elite theory may make it 
somewhat unfit to the need of analysis of elite at local level with more 
non-formal institutional bases. However, even if that is really the case, 
some analytical devices in the elite theory discussed below are 
apparently useful to frame the discussion of local and non-formal 
elites.11 First and perhaps the most important aspect of elite is their 
superiority over the mass. The degree of elite superiority, and how they 
exercise it, may vary from one society to another, but there is no doubt 
that elite superiority does exist. The notion of elite superiority is also 
related to what is known as the relative autonomy of elite. Both 
classical and modern elite theories agree that economic standing is one 
of the strongest bases for elite superiority. With strong economic 
power on their hand, elite members would be able to develop their 
influence over the mass. Another important pedestal for elite 
superiority is, referring to Pareto, intellectual and moral quality. In 
smaller communities where social interactions are more personal, this 
would be far more important than economic prominence to determine 
the ability of elite to control and manipulate the mass. People known 
for their moral and intellectual quality such as religious preachers 
would be the central elements of elite at this scope of community.  
However, it is very important to underline that elite is based more 
on social institutions, not individual. Whereas the individual quality of 
elite members are indeed very important to support their superiority, 
yet the real strength of elite’s social power lies in the institutional 
                                                 
10 Ibid.; Reynolds, “The Power Elite.” 
11 This section will refer to Arslan, “Elite Theory”; Etzioni-Halevy, Network Governance; 
Heywood, Politics; Reynolds, “The Power Elite”; unless indicated otherwise. 
  101 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 01, June 2009 
The pesantren-based Ruling Elite in Sumenep  
aspect--not in as sense of formal organisation, but more of the patterns 
and norms of social interactions in the community that the elite 
members are associated with. The next important aspect of elite, 
therefore, is the shared attitudes and beliefs among their members. The 
elite members would act in accordance with the set of values 
functioning as the guidance of behaviour on the one hand, and the 
expression of group identity on the other. This is how elite members 
may look, and emphasise that they are indeed, different from the 
mass.12 
Another aspect is the competition amongst the elite. If the power 
elite perspective assumes that elite is coherent, the democratic elite 
theory (or competitive elite theory) sees that even among the elite 
members, is a very big issue, and thus rivalry amongst them is a 
significant aspect. There are competitions among them that lead to the 
pyramidal structure of elite, from a very small number of elite at the 
top level, to medium scale elite of a larger number, and to small scale 
elite that often known as sub-elite of even larger number. The 
competitions could even lead to fractured elite structure, where apart 
from the established elite there are also non-established elite groups. 
The competitive nature of elite also has something to do with the fact 
that political transition in most countries would merely mean elite 
circulation, or even elite transformation. 
Religious Elite 
Religion has both individual dimension as the guidance for human 
beings to ‘communicate’ with their Creator, and social dimension to 
govern the relations amongst the mortals. In the latter dimension, 
manifestation of religions by virtue of social structures vary from 
centralised and hierarchical forms such as those in Catholics and 
Iranian Shi’ite Muslim, to a more scattered and decentralised forms 
such as those in Jews and Sunnite Muslim. These structures are run by 
religious figures, with the role ranging from acting as the sole channel 
for humanity to reach the kingdom of heaven, to merely the bearer of 
divine teachings. Whatever the duty to which they may assign 
themselves, these religious figures are nonetheless members of social 
                                                 
12 Political science recognises the existence of elite political culture that “consists of 
beliefs, attitudes and ideas about politics held by those who are closest to the centres 
of political power.” See Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and 
Politics: An Introduction, 5th edition (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 86. 
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elite who share the same characteristics with other elite, with the 
superiority, shared attitudes and beliefs, and competition among each 
other. The religious changing in modern era have never really been 
about the amendment of the doctrinal aspect but more about the 
reinterpretation of the doctrine, or more about the repositioning of 
religious elite and their role in the communities. 
We can take secularism as the perfect example. Secularism is 
largely taken as separation between the state and religion. The term has 
its roots in a value that the state and the religion are dwellers of 
separate realm, and that both have different kind of power that are not 
supposed to interfere with each other. From secularist point of view, 
religion should remain part of human’s individual life, and stay away 
from public space with all those social and political interests. What is 
interesting here is that secularism has one of its pillars on the elite 
competitions in Europe known as the anticlericalism.13 Secularism has 
actually been aiming at excluding the religious clerics (not necessarily 
the religion) from active political role. It is by all means elite 
competition, and may not necessarily stand on some sophisticated 
religious or philosophical paradigm. 
However, as the secular authority “plummeted in the wake of 
corruption, economic failure and political repression”, religion and to 
some extent ethnicity found the opportunity to pave the way for more 
active political role.14 This has been part of what generally referred to 
as religious revival taking place at least since 1950s, the core element of 
which is the redefinition of the role of religious institutions and 
religious elites in modern life. In Latin American states since the late 
1960s, the liberation theology movement have been a good example of 
how religious institutions challenge the authoritarian states and the 
unjust social, economic, and political structures. Casanova interestingly 
points out the general tendency that religions have taken more the side 
of civil society and contributed to the democratisation process in some 
Latin American, Eastern European, East Asian, and South African 
                                                 
13 Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004); Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics 
in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War (California: Harper Collins, 2006). 
14 Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics, Issues in Third World Politics (Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994). 
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countries.15 The roots of this tendency can be found in the efforts to 
redefine the role of religious institutions, including the Second Vatican 
Council Within this movement, echoed in other religious communities 
in varying degrees, the secularist and anticlerical practices were 
challenged, and religious elite found their way to more active political 
role. 
With regards to the political role of religious elite, there are issues 
of legitimacy, with the question of authority being the main aspect. 
Using the classical Weberian perspective there are three types of 
authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal rational. 16  Traditional 
authority is based on the customs and traditions that have already been 
in the society for long time. People obey a regime because it is 
regarded as already in existence with unquestionable legitimacy that has 
been accepted by previous generations. This type of authority can be 
found in small groups or communities with patriarchalism or 
gerontocracy, and is generally the characteristic of system of rule with 
hereditary transfer of power. Rulers are rulers because they have 
ascriptive legitimacy. 
The charismatic authority is based on the personality of individual 
leader, assuming that legitimacy is related to a somewhat spiritual 
quality of the leader and therefore it often has no limit. Charismatic 
leaders can have devoted followers without much depending on 
rational reasons such as the reward and punishment system. Instead, 
charismatic leaderships hinge upon individual faith and trust. 
Legal-rational authority is based on legally defined set of rules and 
would normally be found in the authority of most modern states. Here, 
leaders are elected or appointed not merely on ascriptive and 
charismatic bases, but more on the considerations of capability to 
govern. They are also limited by the set of rule, as to what they are able 
to do, and how long the can remain in power. Greater efficiency would 
be the characteristic of this type of authority, but Weber also feared 
that it would lead to depersonalised and unrelenting social 
environment. 
                                                 
15 Jose Casanova, “Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catho-
licism and Prospective Reflections on Islam,” Social Research, 68, No. 4 (2001). 
16 The compilation or extraction of Weber’s work in English can be found at URL’s: 
http://www.sociosite.net/topics/weber.php and http://ssr1.uchicago.edu/PRELIMS-
/Theory/weber.html. 
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Haynes rightly maintains that religious leaders usually have 
charismatic and traditional authority, and that “religion authority and 
civil authority are nearly always kept separate.” However, in some 
specific cases, such as the case of Khomeini in Iran, a religious leader 
may also achieve the rational-legal authority. “[P]eople have turned to 
religious leaders as sources of authority precisely because of the 
absence of legitimacy and hence authority on the part of civil, secular 
leaders in the context of the failed expectations of modernization.”17  
Given the formal tendency of the elite theory as discussed above, 
observers may not always agree to perceive religious elite as ruling class 
or ruling elite. In countries where religious clerics are separated into 
those who stand outside the state power, and those who gain 
bureaucratic power from the state authority, the elite theory would 
only fit the latter. When trying to describe the majority of ulama as 
being outside state cooptation, Mansurnoor understandably says that 
“[u]nlike bureaucratic ulama, most ulama in Indonesia stand outside 
the ruling class”.18 However, when we take the more generic idea of 
the presence of elite before the mass, as also mentioned above, we do 
not have to limit the application of elite theory only to those with 
formal power. In some traditional communities, the non-formal power 
never really has so much difference from formal power. The elite may 
posses ruling power whether or not they occupy formal position. 
Attributes to the power may vary such as according to the Weberian 
perspective, and may interchangeable one with each other as our 
discussion on religious elite in Sumenep would suggest. 
Kyai Syarqawi and An Nuqayah 19 
The religious elite group that we are discussing here has it 
genealogical root in an ulama called kyai haji Mohammad Syarqawi 
(usually referred to as kyai Syarqawi). There is not much information 
about the early life of Syarqawi, except that he was born in Kudus, a 
town in the present day Central Java province, and that his father and 
grandfather were great ulama in the town. Syarqawi was trained in 
                                                 
17 Haynes, Religion in Third World, pp. 12-3. 
18 Iik A. Mansurnoor, Islam in Indonesian World: Ulama of Madura (Yogyakarta: Gadjah 
Mada University Press, 1990), p. xvii. 
19  Kyai is the title given to Muslim scholars in some Indonesian communities 
particularly in Java and Madura.  
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Egypt and Mecca for a couple of years after his earlier education at 
pesantren in Java, Madura, Kalimantan and the present day Malaysia.20 It 
has always been normal practices for most ulama families to send their 
children to excellent educational institutions, where they would study 
so many things from Arabic language, pedagogy, leadership, and most 
certainly the Islamic knowledge. This educational excellence would 
make the kyai very superior over their communities especially in rural 
areas. Sending their sons to Mecca would also give an additional status 
of hajj for the sons of the kyai who would surely become kyai one day. 
As a son of an ulama, Syarqawi was in Mecca for these reasons. 
In the holy-land Syarqawi met with a rich trader who was also an 
ulama from Prenduan village in Sumenep, kyai Gemma. Doing the hajj 
pilgrimage with his wife, Gemma made good friends with Syarqawi. As 
the story goes, Gemma was very impressed by the young and smart 
Syarqawi.21 Unfortunately for Gemma, his health was not very good 
while doing the pilgrimage. As he was getting very sick, and felt that he 
might pass away in a very close future, he made his last will asking 
Syarqawi to marry his wife if he dies in Mecca. Before too long, 
Gemma passed away, and to fulfil his will, Syarqawi married his widow 
Khadijah.  
In 1875 Syarqawi and Khadijah sailed to Sumenep, and started to 
settle in Prenduan, a wealthy village in the southern coast of Madura. 
In this village Syarqawi taught religious knowledge at a small pesantren 
and soon became very famous across the town. It seemed that his fast-
growing popularity made some kyai in Prenduan unhappy, and forced 
Syarqawi to consider moving to other place to continue his pesantren. A 
friend offered him a block of land with an old stable on it, in a village 
named Guluk-guluk, about 8 km due north of Prenduan. Syarqawi 
migrated to this village, left his pesantren in Prenduan to Chotib, a 
                                                 
20 One source says that Syarqawi stayed in Mecca for as long as 12 years. See H. M. 
Afif Hasan, “Pola Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa oleh Pondok Pesantren an 
Nuqayah” (Unpublished MA Thesis, IKIP Malang, 1995), p. 159. 
21  Huub de Jonge, Madura dalam Empat Jaman (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989); idem., 
“Perkembangan Ekonomi dan Islamisasi di Madura,” in Huub de Jonge (ed.), Agama, 
Kebudayaan, dan Ekonomi: Studi-studi Interdisipliner tentang Masyarakat Madura (Jakarta: 
Rajawali Press, 1989). 
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young kyai from the village. This pesantren would later become the Al 
Amien pesantren.22 
The year was 1887 when Syarqawi started a new pesantren in Guluk-
guluk with an old stable being his very first asset. The pesantren would 
later be named An Nuqayah, literally means ‘the clarity’ or ‘the purity’, 
referring to the title of a kita>b (book) written by Jalal ad-Din Al-Suyuti, 
containing 14 chapters on knowledge.23 
The founding of An Nuqayah marked the new beginning of long 
history of influence and dominance, not only as the result of the 
internal power of this elite group that would be discussed further 
below, but also because the social change in Sumenep in the 19th 
century made it easier for a new social elite group to burgeon. 
Five years before Syarqawi found his pesantren in Guluk-guluk, the 
Sultanate of Sumenep was replaced by regency system as the Dutch 
colonial government moved forward with their direct role not only in 
Madura but across the East Indian archipelago. The last independent 
ruler of Sumenep, Panembahan Notokusumo, passed away in 1879, and 
his uncle was appointed the acting regent by the Dutch government, 
and in 1883 was formally inaugurated as the first colonial regent of 
Sumenep, although he still used the name Pakunataningrat as the last 
king did.24 The power of royal family declined, as now they did not 
have strong material base of power any longer. The upeti system was 
the main source of income for the royal family, and they could no 
longer rely on it since the direct government system and capitalist 
mode of production were engaged.25 The regents began to be paid by 
                                                 
22  de Jonge, Madura dalam Empat Jaman; Idem., “Perkembangan Ekonomi.” The 
pesantren was formally established in 1952 by one of Chotib’s sons, kyai Djauhari. 
23 Interview with kyai Syafi’i Ansori. I also would like to thank Ustadz Mumu Mubarak 
Omo (Perth) for helping me to find the English words with closest meaning to An 
Nuqayah. Please note that the name An Nuqayah was not used until mid-1930s. See 
Sitrul Arsyi et. al., Satu Abad an Nuqayah: Peran Pendidikan, Politik, Pengembangan 
Masyarakat (Sumenep: P.P. An Nuqayah, 2000), p. 1. 
24  Donald Tick, “The Rulers of Madura” (http://www.londoh.com/fotindo_ma-
dura_sumenep_1c.htm, created 2005). 
25  Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris: Madura 1850-1940 (Yog-
yakarta: originally Social Change in an Agrarian Society: Madura, 1850-1940 (Unpublished 
Ph.D Dissertation, Colombia University 1980), translated into Indonesian by M. 
Effendhie & P. Armariepuja, Mata Bangsa, 2002). Upeti is compulsory tribute paid by 
the people for the king; this system was widely used by the traditional rulers in 
feudalistic societies. 
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the Dutch government with monthly salary, and their influence over 
the people faded away very quickly. This social change within which 
the old hegemonic structure collapsed would significantly pave the way 
for religious elite to develop their social significance, 26  in which 
Syarqawi and An Nuqayah played a very central role. 
Pillars of the Genealogical Network 
Whereas the superiority of the religious elite over the mass had 
been mainly based on the educational excellence, their ability to exploit 
social change would require some additional means that included a 
strong and effective network. Syarqawi eventually was able to be on 
the forefront: the most important aspect of the Bani Syarqawi as an 
elite group has been its genealogical network. The fact that Kyai 
Syarqawi was a polygamist seemed to have contributed to this. 
All written and oral sources confirm that Syarqawi had more than 
one wife. There are some disagreements amongst the references 
regarding the wives of Syarqawi,27 but the sources seem to agree that 
Syarqawi have another wife in Kudus, and up two three other wives in 
                                                 
26  As Mansurnoor puts it: “The decline of rato [lit. king] in the face of colonial 
intrusion helped many ulama to share the rato’s prestige at the local level.” 
Mansurnoor, Ulama of Madura, p. xviii; cf. Iik A. Mansurnoor, “Rato and Kyai in 
Madura: Are They Twins?,” in Kees Van Dijk, Huub de Jonge, and Elly Tpuwen-
Bouwsma (ed.), Accross Madura Strait: The Dynamics of Insular Society (Leiden: KITLLV 
Press, 1995). 
27  Bisri Effendy says that Khadijah was Syarqawi’s first wife, and he married the 
second wife in Kudus when he and Khadijah visited the town; see Bisri Effendy, 
Annuqayah: Gerak Transformasi Sosial di Madura (Jakarta: P3M, 1990), p. 56. The later 
sources, including the family tree book of Bani Syarqawi, indicated that Syarqawi had 
already had a wife in Kudus when he started his teaching activities in Prenduan. See 
Muhammad Naqib Hasan et al., Silsilah K. H. Moh. Syarqawi Al-Kudusi, Pendiri Pondok 
Pesantren an Nuqayah, Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep, Madura (Sumenep: IPBS, 1999), p. 4. Cf. 
Arsyi et al., Satu Abad an Nuqayah, p. 2. Controversy is also found regarding the 
children of Syarqawi. Effendy says that Syarqawi had child/children with each of his 
wife, except with Sarbati, the forth one. Quite contrary to that, Hasan writes that 
Syarqawi did not have child from his marriage with Khadijah. See Effendy, Annuqayah: 
Gerak Transformasi Sosial, p. 56, Hasan, Silsilah K. H. Moh. Syarqawi Al-Kudusi, p. 161. It 
is not very easy to decide which version to accept, mostly because the works on the life 
and the early family line of Syarqawi are to a large extent based on oral stories. 
However, given the more detailed data available in the later sources (including the 
years of birth of many people aggregated in the family tree book), the version that 
Syarqawi had already had a wife in Kudus before marrying Khadijah, and that he had 
child/children with each of his wife, is more acceptable. 
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Sumenep after Khadijah. However he was not married to more than 
four wives in a time, because he seemingly married the fifth and the 
sixth wives after the earlier wives passed away. With the total six wives, 
Syarqawi had 25 children both in Kudus and Sumenep.28 It is not an 
exaggeration to say that, with all these, Syarqawi was apparently ready 
to start the huge genealogical network that would later prove to be 
powerful.29 
The main pillars of this network were established around the old 
line that Syarqawi started with when he began to teach in Guluk-guluk. 
In the fifth year the number of santri (student) studying at his pesantren 
had reached as many as 100 people, living in no less than 12 lodgings 
in an area called Dhalem Tenga (lit. central building). When Syarqawi 
passed away in 1910, the leadership of this yet anonymous pesantren was 
continued by Bukhori and Idris, his sons with Khadijah. Syarqawi’s 
son-in-law Imam from nearby Karay village (husband of Syarqawi’s 
daughter with Khadijah, Zubaidah), also helped the brothers managing 
their pesantren. 
In these early stages, the seeds of competition amongst the 
descendents started to grow, partly between the sons of Syarqawi from 
different mothers. By 1920s, some of Syarqawi’s sons with Qamariyah 
came back from their education at pesantren across Madura and Java, 
and also from Middle East, and brought some important changes to 
Syarqawi’s heritage. First and the very obvious change was the 
beginning of what would later form the confederation of An Nuqayah. 
In 1917, Ilyas found his own pesantren in adjacent area to Dhalem 
Tenga, known as Lubangsa. In the same years, a bit physically farther 
apart from Dhalem Tenga, another pesantren named Al Furqan was 
established by a son-in-law of Syarqawi, Hussaini (husband of Aisyah), 
in Sabajarin. Five years later, Ilyas’ younger brother Abdullah Sajjad 
also came back to Guluk-guluk, and found another pesantren in area 
that would later be known as Latee, due east of Lubangsa. Dhalem 
Tenga seemed to decline after the coming back of Ilyas and Abdullah 
                                                 
28 The names, year of birth and inter-marriage relationship will mostly refer to Hasan, 
Silsilah K. H. Moh. Syarqawi Al-Kudusi. 
29 Genealogical network has been one of the main features of pesantren network, with 
various bases, ranging from the bloodline to inter-marriage network. See for example 
Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of 
Traditional Islam in Java (Arizona: Program, 1999). 
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Sajjad. Idris, half brother of these two young kyai, then moved to a 
nearby village Kalabaan and continued to teach his santri here.  
Another important change was the introduction of madrasi system 
as an addition to the sorogan and wetonan systems that had been in use 
since 1887.30 The madrasi system was introduced in 1935 by Khazin, 
son of Ilyas. It was also around this year that the name An Nuqayah 
started to be used, as a holding institution of the Lubangsa, Al Furqan, 
and Latee pesantren.  
During the next 20 years there was no significant change to An 
Nuqayah, until in 1963 Hasan Bashri, Ilyas’ son-in-law established 
another pesantren in the Nirmala area and become the new part of An 
Nuqayah. Hasan Bashri has a more opened vision on the madhhab 
(schools of religious law), and unlike the other kyai from An Nuqayah, 
he did not take Sha>fi`i >yah as the superior madhhab.31 Nine years after 
the founding of Nirmala, another pesantren was established in Lubangsa 
Selatan by Ishomuddin, son of Abdullah Sajjad, younger brother of 
Basyir who runs the Latee pesantren after the death of his father during 
the Indonesian revolution for independence. 
Apart from the five pesantren as the elements of An Nuqayah 
confederation, several other pesantrens were founded by Syarqawi’s 
sons-in-law (many of them were santri at An Nuqayah, or sons of kyai 
from other pesantren) or their descendants, which form the complex 
network and competition of this religious elite group. It is certainly 
important to underline that the santri of An Nuqayah have also spread 
either to come back to their home pesantren or to establish the new one, 
and contributed to this network. From the first generation, one of 
Syarqawi’s sons-in-law, Imam, was the root of one of the extended 
parts of the genealogical network. Imam’s daughter was married to kyai 
                                                 
30 Madrasi is a system similar to that applied in modern educational institutions where 
the santri were divided into classes. Sorogan and wetonan are traditional methods to study 
the kitab kuning (traditional Islamic literature that has been the main sources in 
pesantren). Sorogan is more individual where santri read the kitab kuning independently 
under the supervision of kyai. In wetonan the kyai teach the kitab kuning to the group 
of santri periodically. Some sons and grandsons of Syarqawi were trained at Tebuireng 
pesantren in Jombang and were inspired by the application of madrasi system at 
Tebuireng since a couple of years before. 
31 Hasan, “Pola Pembangunan,” p. 168. We will discuss later that kyai from Nirmala 
was in a political alliance with PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, a political party with the 
modernist Muslim Muhammadiyah communities as the main social base) in the Bupati 
election. 
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Ali Wafa from the coastal village of Ambunten. In the next generation, 
this pesantren (now the Al Aswaja) would become politically important, 
partly because of his access to the kepulauan area from which the 
majority of its santri come from.32 The current important kyai from this 
line is Unais Ali Hisyam. From the second generation, the daughter of 
Ilyas, Badi’ah, is married to kyai Siradjudin who was a santri at An 
Nuqayah and later found Nurul Islam pesantren in Bluto, a village due 
south of Guluk-guluk. This part of network is also politically important, 
as a son of Siradjudin, Ramdlan, is now the Bupati (District Head) of 
Sumenep.  
Long Journey to Legal-Rational Authority 
Education and community empowerment have always been the 
central contribution of pesantren such as An Nuqayah. Today An 
Nuqayah has every level of formal education from primary school to 
college. Affordability of educational cost, and most certainly the full 
time interaction with the kyai and other santri in a religious 
environment, must have been the main reason for parents to send their 
children to this institution. The community development has also been 
part of An Nuqayah with, for instance, the BPM (Biro Pengabdian 
Masyarakat, the community service bureau) that has brought An 
Nuqayah to wider social network across the nation, and gave it 
Kalpataru award in 1981.33 
Involvement in political activities has been initiated since the first 
generation of the Bani Syarqawi. The first formal political position of 
the Bani Syarqawi was achieved during the Indonesian revolution for 
independence, an era when many kyai and santri from pesantren across 
the town were involved in some militias, including Sabilillah that was 
the militia wing of Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, a 
confederation of Indonesian Islamic organisation). Abdullah Sajjad, 
usually depicted to have strong leadership capability, was elected the 
klebun (village head) of Guluk-guluk in 1947. He was killed a couple of 
months later in a battle with the Dutch armed force who was coming 
to Sumenep to put the town under its siege. 
                                                 
32 Kepulauan literally means the archipelago, referring to 126 smaller islands situated due 
north-east of the mainland of Sumenep. 
33 Hasan, “Pola Pembangunan”; interview with Syafi’i Ansori. Kalpatura was award 
granted to individuals or institutions with great achievement in environmental 
conservation, during Soeharto administration. 
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One of the seeds of political role of the Bani Syarqawi could be 
found in the role played by An Nuqayah during the establishment of 
NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) in Sumenep. Ilyas was the first chairperson of 
NU in Sumenep, inaugurated by the first national chairperson of NU 
kyai Hasyim Asy’ari himself in Guluk-guluk. However, considering the 
geographical position of Guluk-guluk, Ilyas handed over the position 
to kyai Abi Syuja’ from the central area of Sumenep three months after 
the inauguration. 34  An Nuqayah was also the central element of 
Masyumi when NU integrated to this organisation both as a social 
organisation prior to Indonesian independence and as a political party 
since 1945. When NU withdrew from Masyumi to become a political 
party in 1952, Ilyas and other kyais in An Nuqayah refused to leave 
Masyumi, even when Kyai Wahid Hasyim (leader of NU Party, son of 
Hasyim Asy’ari) wrote a personal letter asking him to move to the new 
party.35 Later on, Idris, supported by Ishomuddin, joined NU party. 
This would draw a political line in An Nuqayah, if covertly, between 
the kyai involved in Masyumi and those who were in NU party. 
However, when Masyumi was banned in 1960, and NU was integrated 
to PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) in 1973, the political line was 
getting more invisible.  
During the New Order era, PPP was the only effective political 
means for the Bani Syarqawi. From the second generation there were 
Amir, Warits (both are sons of Ilyas), Muqsith (son of Idris), and 
Basyir; while from the third generations were Tsabit (son of Khazin) 
and Syafi’i Ansori (husband of Najahatin, a great-granddaughter of 
Syarqawi). Most of them were members of DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah, the local council) of Sumenep, and Warits was also 
member of the National People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat) 1992-1998. When in 1984 NU made the so-
called ‘return to khittah’ decision and, partly repeating what it did in 
1952, withdrew from PPP and gave up direct political role, elements of 
the Bani Syarqawi decided not to leave PPP, including Syafi’i and 
Warits (repeating his father’s rejection to leave Masyumi in 1952) who 
would remain in the party in the post-New Order era. 
                                                 
34  Arsyi, Satu Abad an Nuqayah, p. 54. NU was found in Surabaya, 1926. Hasyim 
Asy’ari, the grandfather of former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, was the 
teacher of the first and second generations of Bani Syarqawi when they were studying 
at Tebuireng. 
35 Ibid., p. 61. 
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When the New Order collapsed, pillars of the authoritarian regime 
(especially the military, and the state-sponsored party, Golkar) are also 
challenged by the vast majority of the people. Sumenep during this era 
shared the nationally widespread enthusiasm to foster political change. 
The anti-TNI (Indonesian National Military) and, to a lesser extent, 
anti-Golkar feeling were dominant issues in the 1999 general election 
and 2000 bupati election. Elections that during the New Order era were 
merely pesta demokrasi (the democratic festivity), now turned into more 
open political contestation and could be used to push elite circulation. 
This opportunity was taken by pesantren-connected actors to take over 
the power from Golkar, and make the party significantly declined since 
the 1999 general election. The founding of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, sponsored by NU) was surely a big challenge for Golkar. As 
the result of 1999 general elections, PKB over took Golkar’s 
domination in DPRD, and brought some kyai into the council. With 
25 of 45 seats in total, PKB was now the majority, and its leader, Kyai 
Busyro Karim, was later elected speaker of the local council. Many 
members of the Bani Syarqawi were elected, including Hazmi (son of 
Basyir), Syafi’i, Muhsin (son of Amir), and Baihaqi Syafiuddin 
(Syarqawi’s great grandson from Khadijah line). 
Busyro, a kyai from pesantren Al Karimiyyah in Gapura, was in the 
top position in PKB Sumenep branch since its declaration in 1999 
until he was replaced by Kyai Unais Ali Hisyam (Ambunten) in 2007. 
He represents the non Guluk-guluk background (sometimes also called 
the kota connection),36 with a majority of PKB members in DPRD 
having a Guluk-guluk background. With this powerful strategic alliance, 
PKB was ready to move, when the time came for the local council to 
elect a new Bupati. With the legislative top job being in the hand of kyai 
from kota, the natural process in the triangle would now look for those 
with one to fill the leadership position in executive. With the support 
of majority of its sub-branch boards, PKB came to a decision to 
nominate Kyai Ramdlan Siradj from Nurul Islam pesantren, head of the 
advisory council (syuriah) of NU Sumenep branch, in the Bupati 
election. 
While the decision to nominate Ramdlan for Bupati position was 
made without much quarrel, PKB seemed to have some difficulties to 
                                                 
36 Kota literally means city; it refers to kyai in the central area of Sumenep, normally as 
opposed to the Guluk-guluk connection a.k.a. the Bani Syarqawi. 
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determine the right person to be his running partner. Realising that its 
candidate for Bupati had no political experience, let alone the 
bureaucratic skill to govern, PKB had considered picking one of the 
senior bureaucrats in Sumenep to be nominated as the Wakil Bupati 
(vice head of district). It was in this stage, however, that one could 
observe the early sign that the hidden political rivalry amongst kyai was 
now becoming more overt. In the early stage, PKB started with a list 
of senior bureaucrats to be nominated to the second executive position. 
By the behest of Basyir who is a cousin of Ramdlan’s mother and the 
head of PKB advisory council, the party recruited a number of people 
to perform istikha >rah (a prayer to seek the guidance of the God in a 
situation of problem to which no solution is apparent) under the direct 
supervision of Basyir.37 The team was later called tim istikharah, and 
was apparently not able to finish the job, partly because the 
manoeuvres of some kyai disinclined it to make a decision that was 
politically controversial. An important issue at the time was the 
campaign for ABG (asal bukan Guluk-guluk, ‘anything but not Guluk-
guluk’)—a campaign organised by those who wanted the vice Bupati 
position for people with non Guluk-guluk background. One of the 
very blatant manifestations of it was when kyai Said Abdullah from 
pesantren Mathali’ul Anwar in the central Sumenep raised the name of 
his brother in law, Muis Aliwafa, to the vice Bupati candidate market. 
Muis, at the time a head of sub-district in Lamongan, is the cousin of 
PPP leader, Annisah, and his wife is Busyro’s cousin. This made him 
an ideal candidate because he is part of the kota connection. Muis was 
not popular at the time, but since the top executive leaderships were 
elected by the local council, popularity of candidates was not a big 
issue. 
With the pair of candidate --carrying out pesantren’ interest in the 
political process-- PKB was now ready to compete in the Bupati 
election. But it was not until it passed the last test could PKB win the 
election. The incumbent Bupati Colonel Soekarno Marsaid was running 
for a second term of 2000-2005, and seemed to have managed to get 
rid of Police Superintendent Madjid Tawil from PPP’s nomination for 
candidate.38 Without Madjid in the candidate list, the competition was 
simpler. Nevertheless, with anti-TNI feeling expressed widely by civil 
                                                 
37 Radar Madura, April 19, 2000. 
38 Suara Indonesia, April 28, 2000; Surya, April 28, 2000; Radar Madura, May 2, 2000. 
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society elements,39 the incumbent understood that he was not able to 
rely on Golkar and the TNI-fraction any longer. He was then reported 
to offer some money, ranging from IDR 150 million to 300 million for 
PKB members of DPRD to vote for him.40 This was a big issue in the 
media, and PKB’s reputation was surely at risk. It was responded to by 
PKB with the so-called ‘political quarantining’ of PKB members of 
local council in the house of young, charismatic Kyai Rahem Usymuni 
for two nights prior to the Election Day on 3 May 2000. 
The idea of a political quarantine came from Basyir. Rahem, an 
eccentric kyai who was renowned by his supernatural ability, supported 
the idea and seemed to offer his house as the quarantine spot. His 
house, located inside the pesantren Tarate complex, was an ideal place 
for the pre-election quarantine given that it was located less than two 
kilometres from the DPRD building—literally ‘behind’ the local 
council. In this house, all 25 PKB members of DPRD stayed around 
the clock for no less than 48 hours. They were required to make an 
oath to vote for Ramdlan, and were implicitly threatened by serious 
personal and political consequences if known to vote for the 
incumbent, or to receive money from him. On the Election Day they 
were escorted directly to the DPRD.41 
This political manoeuvre evidently worked very effectively. 
Ramdlan won the election with 28 votes, and leaving only 12 for 
Soekarno Marsaid. One step of political change was complete. Now 
the pesantren had a stronger grip on the political process. 
Madjid Tawil’s candidacy via PPP in 2000 could be seen as a 
manifestation of the party’s doubts. PPP has long been the rival of 
Golkar, and during the peak of New Order’s political repression, the 
party was much oppressed, especially at the time of 1982 Election 
where the government adopted a very abrupt attitude toward its 
political opponents. In 1999, when PPP’s political rivalry with Golkar 
was taken over by PKB, the party lost its traditional theme and was 
                                                 
39 Radar Madura, April 11, 2000. 
40  Arus Reformasi, April 5, 2000; Radar Madura, May 2, 2000; Information on the 
amount of money, equal to $ 15,000 to 30,000, was acquired from some kyai. 
41 Suara Indonesia, May 4, 2000; Interviews with Kyai Rahem Usymuni and Mawardi. 
Rahem Usymuni is the son of one of the most influential kyai in the cluster, the late 
Kyai Usymuni. He implicitly admitted that the mafia-style method involved in the 
political quarantine was his idea. 
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politically disoriented. Madjid’s candidacy was a blunder that would be 
best understood in this way.  
PPP has become more firm in its political goals since 2001, when 
Warits returned to Sumenep political stage and led the party. He then 
ran for Sumenep DPRD membership in the 2004 Election. Warits, a 
very experienced politician, was later proven to be a huge political 
threat for PKB politicians. Led by Warits, PPP’s seats in DPRD rise 
from six in 1999 Election to 7 in 2004, whereas PKB declined from 25 
to 23. Warits political artfulness would also be proven later in the first 
direct election of Bupati. 
In his first term of office, Ramdlan was not able to effectively 
control the bureaucracy. Corruption was far from being removed from 
the bureaucratic performance. This has made many kyai feel that the 
district government was getting worse under political leadership of a 
kyai—a view that was shared with other civil society elements 
including the press. On the other hand, Ramdlan also failed to 
maintain good communication with other kyai that supported his 
candidacy in 2000. The senior kyai were frustrated by the fact that their 
access to the Bupati was obstructed by both bureaucratic procedures 
and Ramdlan’s unwillingness to listen to their advice. Many kyais now 
shared the view that having a kyai as a political leader meant nothing 
unless he could carry out the ibadah values in his power performance.42 
Echoing the more general tendencies in local government practices 
in the country since 1999, Sumenep also showed a growing tension 
between executive and legislatures. 43  In this town, the executive-
legislative tension has also had another outlook: emulation between 
Kota and Guluk-guluk clusters. Busyro has become the biggest political 
rival for Ramdlan. Any DPRD’s criticism of the Bupati would to some 
extent be taken as Busyro’s political enmity of Ramdlan, partly because 
                                                 
42 Interviews with Kyai Said Abdullah, Kyai Wadud Munir (An Nuqayah), and Rahem. 
Surabaya Post, February 16, 2005, Bhirawa, March 3, 2005. Ibadah means good deeds in 
accordance with religious obligations. 
43 Legislative bodies during the New Order era were often called ‘rubber stamp’ for 
their limited political power to merely giving formal legitimacy for executive’s policies. 
This has changed since 1998, where political pendulum has swang to the legislative 
side, and created some tensions with executive bodies. 
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it has become publicly known that Busyro wanted to run for the top 
executive position in the forthcoming election.44  
Busyro could actually take advantage of Ramdlan’s declining 
popularity, but he had a problem in gaining support from senior kyai. 
Busyro is a young and brave kyai, but his assertiveness was sometimes 
deemed as arrogance by some senior kyais. To some people, Busyro 
lacked tawad}d}u` (lit. humility), a character that is expected from a kyai, 
and an important élan in NU. Even kyai from Kota would not see him 
as an ideal figure to represent kyai in politics.45 Nevertheless, with his 
position in PKB, Busyro was able to ensure his candidacy in the Bupati 
direct election. Basyir, apparently being bound to his formal position in 
PKB, showed support of Busyro’s candidacy. 
Following the internal process to find the most popular candidate, 
PKB came to decision to give its ticket to Busyro, with Tsabit from An 
Nuqayah as the running partner. Tsabit was later disqualified from the 
candidacy process because his formal education background was lower 
than the minimum requirement; he was replaced by Ramli, a Sumenep-
born bureaucrat from Jember. Elements in PKB was actually still 
hoping that Ramdlan would run for the next term of office using the 
party’s ticket, but the incumbent always said that he was not interested 
to be in the position any longer,46 and was reported to have made a 
statement that being in the pendopo felt like in hell for him.47 In fact, 
Ramdlan never applied for any parties’ ticket to run for Bupati 
candidacy. In the earlier stage, PPP seemed to assume that Ramdlan 
would still be with PKB, and therefore waited for PKB’s decision. 
Warits indicated that if PKB had nominated Ramdlan, PPP would 
have supported it.48 It was now obvious that bringing Ramdlan to the 
Bupati election was PPP’s main objective, for a very clear reason: 
Warits’ had calculated that Ramdlan as the incumbent would have the 
biggest chance to win the election. By supporting his candidacy, PPP 
would make a great investment for its own political goal, especially for 
                                                 
44 This has been his ambition since 2000, and, Busyro indicated, a goal for 2010. 
Interview with Kyai Busyro Karim. 
45 Interviews with Rahem and Said. 
46 Interview with Kyai Ramdlan Siraj. 
47 Interviews with Mawardi, Unais, and Syafi’i. Pendopo is the official residence of the 
Bupati. 
48 Teropong, September 14, 2004. Interview with Warits.  
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the next 2009 general election. Ramdlan’s hesitation to run would only 
be a minor problem for PPP with its existed kyai network having been 
politically rejuvenated by Warits. By the exhortation of Kyai Hammad 
Karay, a much respected and charismatic kyai from a nearby village of 
Guluk-guluk, Ramdlan was finally convinced that his second term of 
office would be the best for the people of Sumenep. Hammad was 
reported to tell Ramdhan that if he would not run for the election, he 
would be z}a>lim (lit. cruel) to the Sumenep people, particularly his 
supporters.49 
Initially, PPP chose Artawi Sahari as Ramdlan’s running partner. 
Following the rejection by majority of sub-branch boards of PPP, 
Artawi was dropped from nomination, and PPP took a senior 
bureaucrat from Bangkalan, Mochammad Dahlan. The official 
explanation had been that Artawi was not able to comply with some 
administrative requirement of the candidacy,50 but the real reason was 
that PPP needed to response properly to the growing demand to 
accommodate people from kepulauan. Dahlan was born in Arjasa 
Island, and would be the best person to ensure the support from 
kepulauan, given the fact that PPP most likely was not able to rely on 
the support from Ambunten cluster to gain vote from the kepulauan, 
because of Unais’ position as the Secretary of PKB that was a formal 
binding for his support of Busyro’s candidacy.  
Busyro and Ramdlan had been the strongest candidates since the 
very beginning, but the political contestation would also become more 
complicated by the tight competitions with other candidates: Muis (the 
vice Bupati), Afif Hasan (son of Hasan Bashri from Nirmala pesantren in 
An Nuqayah), and Madjid Tawil, who this time took Kyai Wakir 
Abdullah (leader of Golkar) as his running mate. Afif, affirming 
Nirmala’s inclination toward modernist Islam, used PAN ticket in the 
candidacy. With all five pairs of candidates having kyai element, this 
election was applauded as a battle of kyai; some people said, looking at 
the fact that level of competition among the sons and grandsons of 
Syarqawi is very high, the candidacy process was ‘the battle of the Bani 
Syarqawi’. This battle was won by Ramdhan who gained 44.08% of the 
total vote. 
                                                 
49 Interviews with Syafi’i and Warits. 
50 Radar Madura, April 15, 2005. 
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Conclusion 
By the year 2010, Ramdlan will be ten years in Bupati position; 
Other Bani Syarqawi figures who are members of DPRD will be in the 
position for at least five years (except for Warits who has a much 
longer record in formal position). This means that in 2010 the Bani 
Syarqawi would have been dominating local politics of Sumenep for 
ten years, with significant achievement of the legal-rational authority to 
continue their traditional authority since 1887.  
We have discussed in this article that their superiority over the 
mass has been mainly based on educational excellence and genealogical 
network that is both powerful and full of conflicts. The social 
significance of the superiority found its way through a social change 
that enabled the religious elite to be the dominant elite group in rural 
communities when the power of their royal counterpart declined 
rapidly. Every political change that took place in modern Indonesia 
would also pave the way for this elite group to transform its traditional 
to legal-rational, culminating in the latest political transition that 
brought members of this elite group to top political jobs at local level. 
Elite theory, with national and formal tendency in its assumptions, 
has proven to be useful to analyse elite at local level with non-formal 
institution being its base. Combined with Weberian model of authority, 
the formalistic tendency of elite theory can be balanced with a 
perspective that elite can develop and exercise power over the mass 
even they are outside the formal structure of politics. [] 
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